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NUCLEAR TESTING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
by
Howard 1. Taubenfeld*
B ECAUSE of technological developments since World War II,
the primitive legal order we call "public international law" is
now faced with challenges of an impressive and frightening nature.
For example, we can circle the globe at the equator in ninety
minutes; we can penetrate into outer space; and we now can employ
the power of the atom for any number of purposes. These recent
changes in technology seriously strain the traditional concepts of
public international law, since those concepts have been based on a
slower-moving, less potentially self-destructive, international society
of nations. In addition to these problems, the infant nuclear-space
age presents demands on international law of even greater sig-
nificance because of the possibility of a transport, communications,
and power revolution of enormous magnitude. Unfortunately, the
new age also brings with it the threat of weapons which are capable
of moving through airspace and outer space at previously unheard
of speeds with fantastic capabilities for long-enduring destruction.
Not only are the nuclear and space technologies new, they are at
the heart of modern attack and defense systems, and are, therefore,
inextricably intertwined with problems of national security and even
national survival. To assume that existing international rules can
offer easy solutions or apt analogies to these problems is to ignore
naively the interrelationship between the new nuclear technology
and the play of power politics in the world. Nevertheless, an analysis
and evaluation of even one facet of the problem, the testing of
nuclear weapons, offer the possibility of determining what con-
temporary law may be applicable to these new situations, and also
indicate what role must be filled by "legislators" and institutional
innovations-if there is to be law at all.
Throughout this discussion, the multiple problems which face
national leaders who are confronted with the choice of conducting
* A.B., LL.B., and Ph.D., Columbia University; Professor of Law, Golden Gate College,
1954-61; Visiting Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, 1961-62; Visiting
Research Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962-63; Co-author,
Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy, with Phillip C. Jessup.
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nuclear tests must be kept in mind. For example, after a tremendous
test series like that of the Soviet Union in 1961, what alternatives
are available to American authorities who are held responsible for
maintaining the United States' ability to defend itself? Despite evi-
dence of substantial Russian progress towards lighter weapons and
perhaps towards an antimissile warhead-which could unbalance
the sensitive arms race against the United States-some persons
criticized renewed United States testing as technically unnecessary,
offensive to world public opinion, perilous due to increased fallout,
and even "immoral."' On the other hand, proponents of renewed
testing urged that Soviet advancements made new United States
atmospheric tests essential to the maintenance of this country's lead
in nuclear developments, and hence, to national security.!
If the problem of national security is truly believed to be the
fundamental issue, even if it is in fact not so, the decision of a
national leader to resume testing will inevitably ignore the more
distant and perhaps not even demonstrable risks of nuclear fallout.
Thus, in justifying the Soviet test series in 1961, Premier Khrushchev
said:
It is not the radioactive fallout that has to be feared but the falling of
the actual nuclear weapon .... If you balance the harm of nuclear tests
to the health of the people against the consequences of the military
application of nuclear weapons, it will be obvious to everyone what
choice has been put before mankind today. . . . The Government of
the U.S.S.R. would not have fulfilled its duty if it did not fittingly look
after the security of the Soviet people.'
Similarly, President Kennedy, while finding it "deeply regrettable"
that the United States would have to meet the Soviet threat by
additional testing, suggested that it was necessary to balance any
new health hazard against "the hazards to hundreds of millions
of lives which would be created by any relative decline in our nu-
' Reportedly sharing this view in early 1962 were: the President's scientific advisor, Dr.
Jerome B. Wiesner, the chief United Nations delegate from the United States, Adlai
Stevenson, the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and many other
government executives. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1962, § 1, p. 1, col. 7, and p. 42,
cols. 4 & 5.
' Reportedly taking this position were the Joint Chiefs of Staff and most of the
military services, the Atomic Energy Commission (with limitations), Dr. Edward Teller,
the Central Intelligence Agency (including its chief, John McCone), and powerful mem-
bers of Congress' Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Underground tests, which avoid
the fallout problem, have been called too limited because of the necessity of having only
small explosions, too expensive, too difcult to instrument, and useless for developing
certain types of weapons, such as a warhead for an anti-missile missile. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1962, § 1, p. 1, col. 7, and p. 42, cols. 4 & 5.
'45 Dep't State Bull. $15, 517 (1961).
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clear strength."4 Therefore, national states clearly put self-preserva-
tion above all other obligations, and indeed, in a world without a
reliable international system for maintaining peace and order with
justice, they have no alternative.
I. THE BACKGROUN--THE POLITICAL DRivE AGAINST TESTING
Much of the discussion about the testing of nuclear devices has
been emotionally colored and confused by the clearly distinct,
broader, and more crucial issue of the use of nuclear weapons in
war. In the world of the "cold-war," developments in chemical,
bacteriological, and psychological techniques of warfare sporadically
receive public attention. This notoriety is similar to the publicity
received by the high explosive and fire bomb raids of the Second
World War, which left mute evidence of the terrors man could
achieve even before the nuclear age. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons
and nuclear testing have aroused a greater and more sustained debate
in the free world than any weapon in history. The potential use of
these weapons has been characterized as "barbarous" and "inhuman,"
on the ground that they disregard the distinction between combatants
and non-combatants and violate the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the
use of gases in warfare.'
People have always protested against a spectacular new weapons
technology, and not without some justice, though the end of the
world, like the oft-anticipated permanent peace of mutual terror,
has not yet materialized. However, since wars have become more
massively destructive, the fears, the widespread revulsion, and the
political outcry occasioned by the thought of mass nuclear destruc-
tion are understandable. Indeed, the world's limited experience with
just two, now obsolete versions of the A-bomb, and the instantaneous
and lingering horrors they produced, was demonstration enough that
technology had this time passed an awesome divide. The area of
potential destruction from a single massive attack was suddenly
"Address by President Kennedy to the Nation, March 2, 1962, in N.Y. Times,
March 3, 1962, § 1, p. 2, col. 1.
5 See, e.g., Address of W. H. Moore, Secretary Gen. of the Int'l Law Ass'n, Int'l Law
Ass'n Conference, New York, August 9, 1954, in N.Y. Times, August 10, 1954, § 1, p. 9,
col. 2. Of course similar characterizations were made of the blockades and unrestricted
submarine warfare and of aerial bombardment of cities in the World Wars, to mention
but a few earlier "innovations" of this century. The Protocol is at 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
The United States is the only major power not a party.
The horror conjured up by use of atomic weapons leads to apparent inconsistencies
in approach. Spaight, for example, in his Air Power and War Rights (3d ed. 1947)
approves area saturation bombing, with its possibility of total destruction, but argues that
atomic weapons are unlawful. Id. at 274. On testing generally see also Oda, The Legal
Basis for Hydrogen Bomb Tests, Jurist 2 (1956).
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widened from a large part of a city to a large part of a continent,
and the potentiality of civilized survival for winners and losers alike
was suddenly telescoped. While pessimists suggest that in an all-out
atomic war the survival of the human race itself is doubtful, Robert
Jungk, in his Children of the Ashes, is more bitterly optimistic, and
foresees that:
What would be left after such a war would not be totally dead desert
without human inhabitants, but rather a single huge hospital, a world
in which everyone was sick or wounded.*
It is not unreasonable to conclude that a weapon of such wide-
spread immediate impact and such uncontrollable, long-range, and
long-run effects is a technological beast of a significantly new breed.
Indeed, the nuclear bomb lacks both military and political flexibility,
for in a major use, its effects could not readily be restricted to its
target or to target populations. Unquestionably then, political and
legal approaches that were really inadequate for even the old-
fashioned horrors of war are much less adequate and relevant to this
new threat posed by military technology.
Therefore, while it may be that the issues raised by testing and
the possibility of test controls are related to the use of these weapons
in wartime, it must be stressed that testing and wartime use are two
quite distinct issues in law as well as in fact. For example, even if we
must conclude that in the contemporary world the use of nuclear
weapons in war is not barred by current international law,' the issues
raised by testing during peacetime under various circumstances and
in various places would still be open to analysis. Conversely, the fact
that at least some testing may be illegal even under current inter-
6 jungk, Children of the Ashes 6 (1961).
'The United States Law of Naval Warfare § 613 (1955) states: "Nuclear Weapons.
There is at present no rule of international law expressly prohibiting states from the
use of nuclear weapons in warfare. In the absence of express prohibition, the use of such
weapons against enemy combatants and other military objectives is permitted." U.S.
Naval War College, International Law Studies 410 (1955). To the same effect, see United
States Law of Land Warfare, Army FM 27-10, at 35 (1956), which states that the use
of atomic weapons "cannot as such be regarded as violative of international law."
On the "law-making" side, in 1960, the First Committee of the United Nations
decided that a ten-power (largely African) resolution declaring that any state using
nuclear weapons would be considered guilty of violating the U.N. Charter lacked sufficient
agreement among the major powers to permit a meaningful vote. See U.N. Gen. Ass. Off.
Rec. 15th Sess., 1st Comm., para. 17 (A/4680) (1960); U.N. Doc. No. A/C.1/L.254,
Add. 1-3 (1960).
On the results of the use of even "primitive" atomic weapons, see Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory, The Effects of Atomic Weapons passim (1950). On the legality of the use
of atomic weapons, see, among many, 2 Oppenheim, International Law 347-52 (7th ed.
Lauterpacht 1952); Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 342-48 (1959);
McDougal & Schlei. The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for
Security, 64 Yale L.J. 648, 688 (1955).
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national law does not prove the illegality of the use of nuclear
weapons in a future war. Of course, the same rationale, the fear for
the survival of the human race, may lead to a condemnation of
both uses in the future if a secure, inspected system of control and
nuclear disarmament can eventually be established.
In spite of the fact that peaceful testing of nuclear weapons is a
distinct issue, testing has been caught up in the general outrage
against wartime uses of nuclear weapons. Sporadic private agitation
and organized political movements have called insistently for a test
ban. Moreover, testing has been attacked by statesmen from "neutral"
nations which are not yet members of the nuclear club and by some
scientists as an evil per se.' Many fruitless hours have been spent in
official negotiations on proposed test bans. However, during all of
these negotiations the implications and promises of a test ban, and
the potential dangers of living without one, have rarely been dis-
passionately analyzed by the groups most aggressively involved. As
a result, this stress on test bans has been at the expense of pursuing
genuinely secure limitations on peacetime production and wartime
use of nuclear weapons. No doubt, it is a dangerous, possibly self-
defeating, and perhaps deliberately diversionary delusion.
A. The Political Rationale Of The Test Ban Movements
All that we have said does not mean that there is no relevant re-
lation between peacetime testing and use in war, for if there were
no relation, why test? Nor do we suggest that the test ban movements
have proceeded without offering any rationale of their own. What
we can offer are some scholarly suggestions as to the various hopes
and interests which have converged to make the test ban movements
both vocal and powerful.
1. The Position of the Nuclear Powers
Many observers have held high hopes for the realization of an
effective test ban because such restraint seemed to be in the self-
interest of the present nuclear powers. The theory is that it would
be politically convenient for those with present nuclear capacity,
and therefore less need to test, to create international rules against
testing and thereby limit the ability of other nations to catch up
8 See, e.g., Address by Jawaharlal Nehru to House of People, Indian Parliament, April 2,
1954, in N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1954, § 1, p. 1, col. 1; Address by James Barrington,
United Nations delegate from Burma, to U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 1, 1954, in N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 1954, § 1, p. 4, col. 7; petition signed by over one hundred members of
the British Labour Party, The Times (London), March 31, 1954, p. 8, col. 2. See also
comments of Dr. Hideiki Yukawa (Nobel Prize winner), N.Y. Times, April 16, 1954, § 1,
p. 7, col. 3 and Albert Schweitzer's letter to London Daily Herald, reprinted in 10 Bull.
Atomic Scientists 339 (1954).
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with them. The rationale has been enshrined in the term, "the
N-country problem"-which symbolizes the problem for the world
and for the current nuclear monopolists of having many more coun-
tries with nuclear weapons capacity.
Experience has underlined the loopholes in this logic. The game
of maintaining military power in a state of balance is at best a
nerve-wracking one, while the lure of unilateral gain is almost ir-
resistible. Indeed the risks involved in trusting others to forego these
gains are great. Obviously the Soviet Union responded either to her
feelings of insecurity or to the lure of unilateral gain, or to both,
when in 1961 she denounced an unpoliced moratorium and resumed
testing. Moreover, in the world today, a nation always has recourse
to the conventional, ultimate excuse for all its acts-the necessity
for self-preservation. In addition, even if inspection, or some form
of verification of performance were specified in a test ban, no
international counterforce now exists to re-impose obligations which
might be unilaterally denounced in the name of imperious necessity.
Finally, even if the nuclear powers could agree to an adequately
controlled and enforced system of test bans, it is not at all clear how
they could legally bind other states not to test.' Consequently, if
they cannot bind all other nations of any size or consequence, dare
they prevent themselves from testing? Indeed, it is difficult, for
example, to conceive of Russian refusal to test because of an inter-
national moratorium, while her neighbor, China, was rapidly de-
veloping nuclear capabilities through unrestricted testing.
2. The Position of the Non-Nuclear Powers
Many of the weakest and least competitive nations which do not
now possess nuclear weapons have been vocally opposed to testing.
For various reasons they are not ready to test; and in fact, many
are presently willing to substitute reliance, express or implicit, on a
major power's nuclear arsenal in place of creating one of their own.
However, it is doubtful if all of these nations with non-nuclear
capabilities will accept indefinitely their inferior power position, for
in doing so they will be allowing themselves to be barred from
effective "self-defense" measures. Indeed, how can a country re-
nounce its right to self-preservation? Moreover, should it?
Once again experience provides the answer. The French disarm-
ament representative, Julius Moch, stated in 1957 that no nation,
including France, would of necessity be willing to stop its testing
'One interesting possible precedent, discussed note 141 infra and accompanying text,
can be found in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, T.I.A.S. No. 4780.
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unless there was a cutoff in nuclear production as well." Moch
reasoned that a mere halt on testing would only permit
unlimited stockpiling of the deadliest weapons in the arsenals of three
States-and three States only-and would create between Powers equal
in law a de facto difference which might in the long run have very
serious consequences."
He also argued in the General Assembly that France "would not
renounce a weapon which other countries, in whose arsenals it was
already, would continue to produce," nor would France consider
binding itself to any agreement reached without its participation
unless France "adhered to it at a later date on such conditions as
might then be decided.
12
Another NATO member, Greece, has also pointed out that unless
the prevention of further dissemination of nuclear weapons were
related to a general disarmament plan, the present de facto mono-
poly would only become a de jure monopoly with the present
nuclear powers continuing to produce and stockpile these weapons.
"The non-nuclear states could not accept such a situation of in-
equality."' 3
What does this mean with respect to the number of potential
nuclear powers? One observer'4 has estimated that eleven states now
have the technical capacity to undertake a nuclear-weapons program
in the near future. These include: Belgium, Canada, Communist
China, Czechoslovakia, both Germanies, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden,
and Switzerland."5 Eight others are limited primarily by a shortage
of scientific manpower but have the necessary technical skills. These
include: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Nether-
lands, Poland, and Yugoslavia." Six or more are "probably economi-
cally capable" but lack industrial resources and scientific manpower.
These include at least: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Spain,
and the Union of South Africa." Obviously other nations, such as
Israel, could be added to the list. Clearly these additional nuclear
powers will increase the number of tests, with their attendant con-
'0 U.N. Doc. No. DC/SC.1/PV.149 (1957).
11 Ibid.
" U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 13th Sess., 1st Comm., 955th meeting, paras. 3, 8
(A/C.1/SR) (1958).
"3U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 14th Sess., Ist Comm., 10$5th meeting, para. IS
(A/C.1/SR) (1959).
'4 Simons, World-Wide Capabilities for Production and Control of Nuclear Weapons,






sequences. It has even been suggested 8 that the number of tests may
increase disproportionately since newly devloped weapons require
more testing than those already proven. Presumably then, with the
current status of technology, the closer a nation is to genuine nuclear
capacity the sooner it will drop out of the ranks of the "neutral,"
pacifist, anti-testing states.
3. The Intellectuals, the Scientists and the Lunatic Fringe
The popular mass movements and political agitation against test-
ing have had their impact on the actions of governments which could
probably never have had any serious expectations of consumating
a workable universal test ban. Indeed, these movements have proba-
bly been the most persuasive force for continuing negotiations. Of
course, they may also have been a convenience to (and even at times
been encouraged by) one particular side in the cold war.
Putting aside ulterior motives, both to the common man as private
agitator and to the intellectual forces in the test-ban movements,
the presumed health menace from testing has probably been upper-
most in mind. Nevertheless, there have also been several political
rationales offered to explain the necessity for an immediate test ban.
One theory, previously mentioned, is the "N-country problem"-the
thought that, if we somehow keep to a minimum the number of
nuclear powers by maintaining the existing monopoly and prohibit-
ing new tests, we will minimize the danger of accidental or irrational
nuclear war.1" The inescapable implication of this theory is that the
current monopolists are more responsible than the remaining nations
and that, in any event, they are fewer.
Another suggestion for a nuclear test renunciation by the West is
based on the idea that the present policy of survival and maintenance
of peace, the so-called "balance of terror" theory, is conceptually
inadequate or unworkable. First, it is argued that imbalance is some-
how even less dangerous than testing and secondly, that "balance"
has never prevented the eventual outbreak of war in the past."0
Finally, the pacifists have carried the "balance of terror" argument
to what in logic amounts to unilateral nuclear disarmament. Their
argument is that since not all present and future nuclear powers
can be trusted to refrain in all circumstances from using nuclear
weapons in wartime, and since it is even better to be "red than dead,"
"s Issues Before the Fifteenth General Assembly, Int'l Conc. No. 529, at 31 n.60 (1960).
19 For a recent discussion of some aspects of the problem, see Kahn, The Arms Race and
Its Hazards, 89 Dxdalus 744, 776 (1960); Wohlstetter, Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the
N + I Country, 39 For. Aft. 355 (1961).




they suggest that the only safe course is for the West to give up
nuclear tests and weapons and thus avoid provoking the use of such
weapons. It is thus deemed preferable to achieve world integration
by unilateral surrender, if necessary, than to risk humanity's de-
struction. 1 To whom one surrenders is not made clear, nor are
the mechanisms for doing so, nor the potentials for subsequent
survival. It is equally unclear how this would prevent nuclear war
between the irrational groups of nations, with devastating effects
on all.
B. Testing And Human Health
We have left for analysis the key and unprecedented question
raised by testing nuclear devices above ground-the crucial issue of
whether such tests are dangerous to mankind in and of themselves,
and, if so, to what degree. Surely this question demands clarification
before any rational evaluation of the place of testing in law and
ethics can be made. Above all other issues, the health issue appears
to have captured the imagination of the common man, because all
groups which call for a ban unite at least in claiming interest and
concern over this vital problem.
Unfortunately, the precise nature and extent of the danger is
impossible for a layman to determine. Governmental secrecy is one
factor, but also, there are conflicts-often honest conflicts-existing
in the evaluations offered by leading scientists-even among those
without a vested-interest position to protect.
Scientists do agree that radioactivity in any quantity is bad for
the human body, though we are subjected to it constantly from
natural sources, medical tests, industrial activity, and the like."2
However, the controversy concerning us is over the actual amount
of fallout of radioactive particles from nuclear tests and the level
at which this fallout, or this source added to all other sources, con-
stitutes a danger to present or future generations. " Among the
possible dangers from these fallout products (and other heavy radia-
tion sources) are: (1) bone cancer and leukemia in children, caused
by concentrations of strontium 90; (2) cancer of the thyroid, caused
by iodine 131; and (3) mutations, in which cesium 137 may prove
the key problem.24
" See Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (1959); Fromm, The Case for
Unilateral Disarmament, 89 Dxdalus 1015 (1960), and sources there cited.
2 Scientific Comm. on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Report, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off.
Rec. 13th Sess., Supp. No. 17, paras. 54, 56 (A/3838) (1958).
23 There is a useful popular account of the problem in Time Magazine, Nov. 10, 1961,
pp. 21-25. See also the sources cited notes 28, 30, 34, 44, 126 infra.
24 Scientific Comm. on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Report, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off.
Rec. 13th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/3838) (1958).
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Estimates of the degree of risk involved in testing range from
the frightening suggestions of Dr. Linus Pauling to the more re-
assuring views expressed by Dr. Edward Teller. Dr. Pauling has
argued that the fallout danger point was reached with the first
atomic tests in 1954. He has stated that one fifty megaton device,
which was the size of a bomb in the Soviet Union 1961 series, would
cause 40,000 infants to be born with physical defects in a few
generations and over 400,000 in a 6,000 year period."5 He also
expects innumerable cases of bone cancer, leukemia, and physical
defects in humans now alive."6 At the other extreme are: Dr. Edward
Teller, who states that "the fallout danger is grossly and im-
properly exaggerated";" the United States Atomic Energy Com-
mission, which announced, for example, that the total amount of
radiation from "all nuclear explosions to 1955" amounted to the
equivalent of one chest X-ray per person;" and the U. S. Public
Health Service, which stated, after the Russian tests in 1961, that
those tests "do not warrant undue public concern" and that even
in the future "very few people will be affected" by that series."'
Similarly, it has been said that long-range effects of tests are
C'minute" and "of a low order" in comparison with natural back-
ground radiation in the earth and the atmosphere,"0 and, that a
United States test series in 1962 would produce radioactivity "less
than one fiftieth of the difference which can be experienced, due to
variations in natural radioactivity, simply by living in different
locations ... "31
Largely in order to provide a basis of knowledge for the rational
consideration of radiation hazards caused by nuclear testing within
the general context of all radiation to which mankind is exposed,
the United Nations created a Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) in 1955.a" The Committee is made
21 Quoted in Time Magazine, Nov. 10, 1961, p. 24. Similarly, Dr. Sturtevant has
estimated that, at a minimum, 1,800 of the 90 million children born in the world in
1954 were adversely affected by radiation from thermonuclear tests in that year. Quoted
in Plumb, Science in Review, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1955, § 4, p. 11, col. 7. Compare
however his more cautious statement in his letter to the N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1955,
4, p. 9, col. 6.
2Time Magazine, Nov. 10, 1961, p. 24.
27 Quoted in Time Magazine, Nov. 10, 1961, p. 24. See the detailed analysis in Teller,
The Legacy of Hiroshima (1962); Teller & Brown, The Fallout Scare, The Saturday
Evening Post, Feb. 10, 1962, p. 34.
2" Statement by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, AEC Press Release, Feb. 15, 1955, p. 4.
" Cited in Time Magazine, Nov. 10, 1961, p. 24.
30 Eisenbud & Harley, Radioactive Dust from Nuclear Detonations, 117 Science 141,
147 (1953).
3' Address by President Kennedy to the Nation, March 2, 1962, in New York Times,
March 3, 1962, § 1, p. 2, col. 1.
"
2U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 913 (X) (Dec. 3, 1955).
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up of renowned scientists from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bra-
zil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden,
the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. While in technologically developed countries,
medical activities are by far the largest artificial source of ionizing
radiation, it was, of course, the artificially created radiation result-
ing from nuclear test explosions which aroused world opinion and
led to the creation of this Committee.33
Between March 1956 and June 1958, the Committee considered
some 213 reports received from 30 governments and 4 United
Nations' specialized agencies, while concentrating on two areas of
study: (1) the levels of radiation to which human beings are and
will be subject, and (2) the somatic and genetic effects of those
levels on man. A comprehensive Report in seven chapters with
nine scientific annexes was issued in 1958.
While the Report stressed that current exposure to radiation was
overwhelmingly from natural sources and from industrial, research,
and medical applications, it did state that radiation from explosions,
though relatively small even with postulated continued testing, "con-
stitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels."'" The
Committee found that lack of knowledge as to whether radiation
thresholds existed for the induction of leukemia or bone tumors
made it impossible to evaluate with any certainty the effects of all
sources of radiation, but they warned that available evidence indi-
cated that the genetic harm of radiation is "cumulative. '" 30 "Many
effects of irradiation are delayed; often they cannot be distinguished
from effects of other agents" but "individuals in large populations,
or particular groups such as children and foetuses may have special
sensitivity."" Further, the Committee reported that
Exposure of gonads to even the smallest doses of ionizing radiation can
give rise to mutant genes which accumulate, are transmissible to the
progeny and are considered to be, in general, harmful to the human
race. As the persons who will be affected will belong to future genera-
tions, it is important to minimize undue exposures of populations to
such radiation and so to safeguard the well-being of those who are
still unborn.3
3 Bacq, The U.N. Radiation Committee, 14 Bull. Atomic Scientists 56 (1958).
"' Scientific Comm. on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Report, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off.
Rec. 13th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/3838) (1958). The Report is summarized in Issues
Before the Thirteenth General Assembly, Int'l Conc. No. 519, at 26-32. (Sept. 1958).
3
1 Id. at 37.




The Committee also indicated that while the results could be little
more than guesses due to lack of scientific knowledge at this time,
the number of cases of leukemia caused by testing to 1958 might
range from 2,000 down to none (contrasted to 15,000 due to natural
radiation), depending on whether future studies showed that this
type of radiation was a factor in causing the disease. The Committee
estimated that 2,500 to 100,000 major genetic defects (of a total
of 700,000 to 3 million such defects) in a population of 5 billion
might be caused overall by fallout." These facts were said to "render
it very difficult to accumulate reliable information about the corre-
lation between small doses and their effects either in individuals or
in large populations."4 The Committee rejected, on political grounds,
any direct call for the halting of testing4 but pointed out that
all steps designated to minimize irradiation of human populations will
act to the benefit of human health. Such steps include the avoidance
of unnecessary exposure resulting from medical, industrial and other
procedures for peaceful uses on the one hand and the cessation of con-
tamination by explosions of nuclear weapons on the other.4'
The Committee thus failed to endorse a particular position. On
the one hand, it indicated that testing to 1958 was comparatively
harmless since it added only a very small amount to radiation from
natural sources and such man-made sources as X-rays. On the other
hand, it stressed that there was at least some danger, particularly
genetically, in any increment of radiation.
The Committee was asked to continue its work after delivering
the 1958 Report and a second comprehensive report is to be issued
in 1962. Since 1958 UNSCEAR has worked closely with the World
Health Organization in fields of radiation-induced diseases and
human genetics, with the Food and Agricultural Organization on
radioactive contamination of foods, and with the World Meteorologi-
cal Organization on aspects of stratospheric fallout. In addition, it
has requested the nations of the world and some thirteen United
Nations-related agencies to furnish it with information.
As a result of the steadily mounting flow of information to
'Oid. at 42.
40 Ibid.
41 Id. at 41.
41 Ibid.
43See, e.g., U.N. Doc. No. A/4119 (1959); U.N. Press Release No. AC/381, July 8,
1959. Some twenty-one states are now engaged in analyzing fallout samples for themselves
and their neighbors, with attention being focused on carbon-14, strontium-90, and cesium-
137 levels in diet and food chain. Several major areas, mainland China, for example, are
not furnishing data, but the flow of facts and figures has nevertheless increased tremendously
since the Committee's early years. UNSCEAR, Annual Progress Report for 1960, U.N.
Doc. No. A/4528 (1960); Yearbook of the United Nations 31, 33 (1960).
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UNSCEAR, ideas are changing. Thus, while natural radiation is still
many times greater than man-made, it is now realized that fallout
is reaching the earth much more rapidly than previously believed.44
The Committee has also indicated that, although gross effects result-
ing from high doses of radiation are fairly well known, knowledge
of the effects of lower doses and dose rates and of delayed manifesta-
tions is quite scanty. Of course, in all these matters the Committee
studies the effects of natural radiation since it constitutes the major
source from which the world receives exposure, and, therefore, offers
a "valuable basis with which the magnitude of artificial radiation
sources can be compared."45 It may be hoped that the Committee's
1962 report, or its future efforts, will furnish a conclusive basis from
which governments and their peoples may derive some understand-
ing of the nature of the beast which they can release to stalk the
earth. However, even without further reports, though some scientists
and statesmen tend to minimize and some tend to overemphasize the
problem, due in part to the limited information which has penetrated
official barriers of secrecy, the actions of governments themselves-
the clearing of test areas, the checks and counts on fallout, on
strontium 90 in dairy products, and on radioactive materials de-
posited on aircraft-all confirm that at some point the results of at
least certain types of nuclear testing are acknowledged to be danger-
48ous to man.
That this acknowledgement is an important source of agitation
against testing cannot be doubted. We cannot overlook the fact that
the testing of nuclear weapons, like their use in wartime, is radically
different from the testing of more easily limited weapons in that
the radiation effects may transcend national borders and physically
affect the lives of unborn generations. As India's Krishna Menon has
argued, scientists generally agree that the smallest amount of external
radiation is harmful in increasing mutation of genes and "man ha[s]
no right to set in motion forces over which he ha[s] no control.""
He has also stated that
Whether these bombs are exploded in Siberia or in the Pacific or in
Australia or in the Arc de Triomphe in Paris or in these buildings of
the United Nations the issue is the same. The explosion anywhere is
an explosion against humanity.4
4 This information was released by the AEC and the Defense Department. See also
Norwegian Report, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.82/G/L.336, at 1 (1960); Schneir, A Primer on
Fallout, The Reporter, July 9, 1959.
45 U.N. Doc. No. A/4528, para. 6 (1960).
41 See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text.
4 U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 12th Sess., 1st Comm., 873rd meeting, paras. 14, 26
(A/C.1/SR) (1957).
4U.N. Doc. No. A/C.I/PV.1045, at 29 (1959).
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Thus both the testing and the use of nuclear devices raise new
moral challenges concerning such issues as the right of survival of
the race and the right of future generations to undistorted lives in
an unpolluted atmosphere. The issues are far more acute in banning
wartime use than in barring further tests, but they seem to exist in
both. These problems are, perhaps, not yet all legal issues, although
interest in human rights in general as a part of the law is not a new
concept. In any case, since ethics is the foundation for community
law, it is possible to assert that they should even now be treated as
legal problems since new rules for the protection of man are neces-
sary. Furthermore, since the older legal precedents developed in
a fundamentally and crucially different technological milieu, the
old concepts may well be inadequate or not even pertinent to
present needs.
II. THE ATTEMPT TO MAKE LAW
Due to several factors-the widespread fear over nuclear tests,
the confluence of the various movements in favor of a ban, and the
apparent possibility of detecting at least some forms of nuclear
tests-proposals for prohibitions on all or most nuclear testing have
come to play an increasingly important part in the disarmament
negotiations of recent years. In turn these negotiations have shed
light on both the degree of interest in a test ban and on the difficulties
and dishonesties inherent in any such simple proposal.
Suggestions for a halt to nuclear tests have been frequently ad-
vanced in the course of disarmament negotiations both in and out
of the United Nations.49 For example, a suspension of testing was
suggested by the Soviet Union in 1955 and again on June 14, 1957,'9
while disarmament sessions were in progress.
Other proposals for a ban were simply unilateral statements which
were not necessarily issued at the time of any disarmament confer-
ence. One such unilateral declaration was made on March 31, 1958,
when the Soviet Union, after completing an intensive series of
nuclear tests, announced a unilateral cessation of testing, while re-
serving its right to "act freely" if others continued to test." Of
" For a review of these matters, see Fry, The Quest for Disarmament Since World
War II, Arms Control 43-46 (1961); Issues Before the Sixteenth General Assembly, Int'l
Conc. No. 534, at 7-22, 24-27 (Sept. 1961); Issues Before the Fifteenth General Assembly,
Int'l Conc. No. 529, at 9-35 (Sept. 1960); Issues Before the Fourteenth General Assembly,
Int'l Conc. No. 524, at 8-26 (Sept. 1959); Issues Before the Thirteenth General Assembly,
Int'l Conc. No. 519, at 8-17, 19-22 (Sept. 1958); Nogee, The Diplomacy of Disarmament,
Int'l Conc. No. 526, at 263-66 (Jan. 1960).
so See U.N. Doc. No. DC/112, Annexes 5, 7, 12 (1957).
51 38 Dep't State Bull. 647-48 (1958).
[Vol. 16
NUCLEAR TESTING
course, at the time, United States tests were scheduled to begin in
the spring and summer of 1958.
Shortly after the Soviet proposal in 1958, a conference of experts
from East and West met at Geneva from July 1 to August 21,
1958, in closed session and concluded, somewhat hopefully, that it
was technically feasible to set up "a workable and effective control
system to detect violations of an agreement on the world-wide
suspension of nuclear weapons tests.""2 The Soviet Union thereupon
demanded an immediate discontinuance of tests, but the West in-
sisted upon, and Russia then agreed to, a second conference in
October to negotiate an agreement." Nevertheless, both the United
States and Britain conducted tests in the spring and summer of 1958,
and the United States, on August 22, 1958, concluded by stating
that it would not test for a year after the October conference began
if the Soviets did not.
Insisting on the right to conduct as many tests as the West, the
Soviet Union then conducted a series of tests beginning October 1,
1958. Meanwhile the second Geneva conference dragged on through
periods of deadlock, clarification, and stalemate. A suggestion by
President Eisenhower on April 13, 1959, that the "first and readily
obtainable step [be] an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons tests
in the atmosphere up to fifty kilometers" was rejected by Premier
Khrushchev as "a dishonest deal." 4 However, the United States,
Britain and the Soviet Union did announce a moratorium on testing
after Russia's series in the fall of 1958.
The suspension of testing was again discussed in the Fourteenth
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1959, and two resolu-
tions resulted. One called upon Russia, Britain, and the United
States to continue their voluntary halt to testing and to agree on
a treaty. The second one appealed to "other States" to desist from
testing and was obviously directed at France." The French govern-
ment, nevertheless, conducted two tests in 1960, thereby becoming
the fourth nuclear power."
Again in early 1960, the United States proposed a treaty halting
above-ground tests and tests in the atmosphere and outer space.
5 2 U.N. Doc. No. A/3897, at 20 (1958).
" See U.N. Doc. No. A/3896/Rev.1 (1958); U.N. Doc. No. A/3904, at 2 (1958);
39 Dep't State Bull. 378 (1958).
2440 Dep't State Bull. 705 (1959).
55See U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1402 B (XIV) (Nov. 21, 1959). For the French comment,
see U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 14th Sess., Ist Comm., 1059th meeting, para. 18 (A/C.1/SR)
(1959).
s6 See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
" See 42 Dep't State Bull. 237-38 (1960).
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Some Soviet concessions and further Western proposals followed,
but the collapse of the May 1960 summit meeting ended this major
hope abruptly. Despite this, the informal moratorium on testing by
the United States, Russia, and Britain stayed effective from late
1958 until the Soviet Union's vast test series in the fall of 1961.
After the Soviet Union announced its plans to resume nuclear
tests on August 31, 1961, and began its series the next day, the
United States and Britain proposed that "tests in the earth's atmos-
phere producing fallout be stopped without delay" and announced
their continued readiness to "negotiate a controlled nuclear test ban
agreement of the widest scope."" Then, on October 27, the General
Assembly adopted by vote of 87 to 11 a resolution solemnly ap-
pealing to the Soviet Union to refrain from carrying out its inten-
tion to explode a fifty megaton device in the atmosphere." Neither
plea was heeded.
Both in 1960 and in 1961, the General Assembly asked that all
tests, without differentiation, cease even though there would be no
more adequate inspection or enforcement of the cessation than there
had been under the broken moratorium. The 1961 appeal, which
carried by vote of 71 to 20, cited "the grave and continuing hazards
of radiation resulting to humanity from test explosions" and both
expressed its "deep concern and profound regret that test explosions
have been resumed" and "earnestly urge[d] the States concerned to
refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of
necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests.""
While the resolution explicitly noted the current lack of binding
international law outlawing tests, the United States felt unable
to support even an appeal in this form, arguing that control is "an
indispensable prerequisite for the permanent cessation of tests.""1
Unpoliced moratoria are otherwise a form of unilateral disarma-
ment, giving perhaps crucial advantage to the dishonest. As President
Kennedy said in March 1962: "We know enough now about broken
negotiations, secret preparations and the advantages gained from a
long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. '
5845 Dep't State Bull. 475-77, 515 (1961).
5 For text see 45 Dep't State Bull. 817 (1961).
6 U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1648 (XVI) (1961). For the resolution of 1960, see U.N. Gen.
Ass. Res. 1577 (XV) (1960).61See, e.g., U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1577, 1578 (XV) (1960); U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec.
15th Sess., 1st Comm., 1135th meeting, para. 27 (A/C.I/SR) (1960); 45 Dep't State Bull.
936, 938 (1961); 44 Dep't State Bull. 94 (1961).
62 Address by President Kennedy to the Nation, March 2, 1962, in N.Y. Times, March
3, 1962, § 1, p. 2, col. 1. There may, of course, be some types of nuclear tests which
can be policed by existing means without an international organization. President Kennedy
and Prime Minister MacMillan, for example, proposed a cessation of atmospheric tests to be
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With the conclusion of the Soviet tests series in 1961, that nation
has again become the champion of an unpoliced moratorium on test-
ing while denouncing Western tests as "aggressive.""
Thus, whatever nuclear horrors the various governments may
conjure up, it cannot be said, in the current state of international
law and international "legislation," that tests of nuclear devices are
per se illegal. The problem then becomes, When are tests illegal?
III. TESTING: EXISTING LAW AND PRECEDENTS
It is obvious that the potentially deleterious effects of testing can
be conveniently classified as immediate or remote, and divided into
effects which occur at or near the test site and those which extend
over a wide area through fallout or other radiation processes. It is
fitting, therefore, to analyze legally the present status of testing
from the point of view of the right of access to and use by the states
of the various possible test sites. Consequently, our attention will
turn first to the present legal implications and obligations created
by the more wide-spread effects and then to the rights and remedies,
present and prospective, of other nations and the world community.
For purposes of discussion, nuclear tests conducted underground on
national territory with appropriate safeguards will be ignored. While
more problems have been encountered in conducting such tests
safely than seem to have been anticipated, to the extent that danger-
ous materials escape above the surface, such tests can be equated with
surface testing for legal analysis. Having already discussed the
legality of tests per se, we are left to deal with tests on national
territory, on the territory of dependent peoples, on, under, and over
the high seas, in airspace and outer space, and in the Antarctic.
A. Testing Weapons On National Territory Or In National Airspace
In a broad general sense, the testing of military devices on na-
tional territory has never been considered to be illegal per se in
international law. The sovereign supremacy of a nation within its
own territory is still a basic doctrine in international law, and cer-
tainly to the extent that such tests do not directly interfere with
or harm another nation's population, or "property" interests, the
concept of non-interference in matters essentially within a state's
policed by existing national means in September 1961. For analysis of this aspect of the
problem of controls, see Bloomfield, The Politics of Arms Control: Troika, Veto, and Inter-
national Institutions, Study Memorandum No. 3, Institute for Defense Analysis (Oct. 6,
1961). See also Ik6, After Detection-What? 39 For. Aft. 208 (1961).
" See, e.g., Address by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin, U.N. Disarmament Con-
ference, April 26, 1962, in N.Y. Times, April 27, 1962, § 1, p. 4, col. 3.
1962]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
domestic jurisdiction will prevail. 4 Similarly, every nation today
claims sovereignty in the airspace above its national territory, and
this doctrine is expressly recognized in the important international
treaty arrangements concerning the use of airspace." For example, the
Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation"6 provides in article one that
The Contracting States recognize that every State has complete and ex-
clusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
For our purposes, "airspace" and atmosphere may be equated. (In
the Chicago Convention the term "airspace" appears as "espace
atmosph~rique" in the French text.) Therefore, in this sense also,
the testing of military devices in the airspace superjacent to national
territory cannot be said to be per se illegal.
In one situation it is conceivable that the United Nations Charter
might be taken to be a limitation on any sort of testing. Under
article 2 (4), members are to refrain from "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." Article 39 empowers the Security Council to act
in the event of its determination that a "threat to the peace" exists.
While it may be only a remote possibility, one can at least imagine
the "testing" of a weapon on or over a nation's own territory as part
of a program designed to coerce and improperly influence another
nation. It might thus even constitute a "threat of the peace" within
the meaning of the Charter. This interpretation might be especially
applicable in the case of a long continued series of tests. Short of
this possibility, however, on the previously discussed assertion that
nuclear tests are not now per se illegal in international law, it seems
clear that there is now no legal bar to testing on national territory-
at least if the physical effects of the tests do not pass beyond the na-
tion's borders. Of course, this last supposition is crucial and is re-
served for later discussion.
B. Testing On Or Over Dependent Territories
While tests on, under, or above national territory which do not
have any effect outside that territory appear to be legally unobjec-
tionable, despite potential criticism on moral grounds, the question
64 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
65 For discussion of this point see Jessup & Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer Space and
the Antarctic Analogy 201-03 (1959).
6'61 Stat. 1180 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1591.
67 Assuredly the General Assembly, within the scope of article 10 of the Charter and
the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, would be able to discuss such a situation and
make recommendations to members as well.
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of whether dependent territory constitutes "national territory" has
already, in a sense, been raised in past test series. In 1954, for ex-
ample, as a result of United States' experiments, the inhabitants of
the Marshall Islands petitioned the Trusteeship Council of the United
Nations for an end to testing in the Islands, or at least for a guarantee
of stricter safety measures."
The background of this complaint is very revealing. In 1946,
the United States conducted tests on Bikini Atoll of the Marshall
Islands." In 1947, the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas were placed
under United Nations trusteeship with the United States as Admin-
istering Authority."' The area, consisting of ninety-eight island
groups, with 2,141 small islands having a total land mass of 846
square miles and spread over three million square miles of ocean, was
made a strategic trust under article 82 of the United Nations Char-
ter-the only Trust Territory so designated.' Article 13 of the
Trusteeship Agreement establishes the right of the United States to
close any part of the Territory at any time "for security reasons,"
meaning those of the United States. This article was accepted by
the unanimous vote of the Security Council at its meeting on April
2, 1947. While the United States thus claims and exercises sub-
stantial and potentially perpetual control over these island groups,
it does not claim sovereignty over them. For internal law purposes
they are not considered part of the "territory" of the United States.7
Nevertheless, they must be considered "American" for many pur-
poses. Indeed, the very purpose of this strategic trust is both to pro-
vide for the development of the area and at the same time "to make
it possible fully to protect the vital security interests of the United
States. . . ."" Also, it should be recalled that this Trusteeship Agree-
ment was unanimously approved by the Security Council of the
United Nations after the first series of atomic tests and in the face
of an American statement that though' it would not insist on the
use of the terms "as an integral part of the United States" in de-
8 See U.N. Doc. No. T/Pet.10/28 (1954).
Co N.Y. Times, July 1, 1946, § 1, p. 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, July 25, 1946, § 1, p. 1,
col. 8.
" See Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947,
61 Stat. 3301 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189 (cited hereafter as "Trusteeship
Agreement").
71 Ibid.7
1See Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936
(1958); Note, Trusteeship as Foreign Country-Kwajalein and the Tort Claims Act, 4 Viii.
L. Rev. 149 (1958).
" Hearings on the Charter of the United Nations Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1945).
1962]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
fining its powers over the area, the area would in fact be so treated. 4
Experiments relating to nuclear fission were held from 1947 on-
ward, including the thermonuclear developments in 1951 and 1952.
These were notified to the Security Council, and were well covered
in the press, but no nation, including the Soviet Union, made any
protests whatever until the incidents of 1954. In 1947, the United
States had moved the inhabitants of Eniwetok atoll to Ujelong atoll
so that Eniwetok could serve as an atomic proving ground. Bikini
was also included in the restricted area in 1953-54. The authority
of article 13 of the Trusteeship Agreement was exercised when the
land and air space of the atolls "and the territorial waters adjacent
thereto" were thus closed for conducting tests.7 ' However, several
hundred Marshallese were exposed to radioactive fallout in 1954,
thereby causing the question to be raised anew in the United
Nations. A Marshallese petition that year complained that people
were injured on Rongelab and Uterik atolls by drinking polluted
water and that they were losing their homes as atolls were preempted.
In response to the islanders' petition, the Soviet Union and India
introduced resolutions in the Trusteeship Council demanding the
cessation of experiments on the grounds that they violated the Ad-
ministering Authority's duties under the Charter and the Trustee-
ship Agreement. It was suggested,7 for example, that testing could
hardly be said to "protect the health of the inhabitants," to promote
their "economic advancement," or to protect them against "loss of
their lands or resources, ' 78 nor did it live up to article 73 of the
United Nations Charter which establishes "the principle that the
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount." 9 In
4 U.N. Security Council Off. Rec. 2d year, 116th meeting 473 (1947). See also U.N.
Security Council Off. Rec. 2d year, 122d meeting, paras. 630-31 (1947); U.N. Security
Council Off. Rec. 2d year, 113th meeting, para. 415 (1947).
" See Letters from the Representative of the United States to the United Nations, U.N.
Security Council Off. Rec. 2d year, Supp. No. 20, Annex 46, at 169 (Doc. No. S/613)
(1947); U.N. Doc. No. S/2978 (1953). For an account of the tests and their results, see
Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 Yale L.J. 629, 630-32
(1955); McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for
Security, 64 Yale L.J. 648, 650 (1955). For documentation on the "testing areas," see U.S.
Naval War College, International Law Situations 1956, at 609-29. Accounts of the Pacific
tests may also be found in 39 Dep't State Bull. 237, 378-79 (1958); 36 Dep't State Bull.
101, 901-04 (1957); 35 Dep't State Bull. 704-15 (1956); 31 Dep't State Bull. 137-40
(1954); 30 Dep't State Bull. 548-49, 886-88 (1954).
70 U.N. Doc. No. T/C.2/L.101 (1954) (Soviet resolution); U.N. Doc. No. T/C.2/L.104
(1954) (Indian resolution).
17 Margolis, supra note 75, at 643-45.
78 These terms are in article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement.
7" See remarks of the Soviet and Indian representatives in the U.N. Trusteeship Council
and its Committee on Petitions, U.N. Trusteeship Council Off. Rec. 14th Sess., 561st meet-
ing, paras 244-48 (1954); Standing Committee on Petitions, U.N. Doc. No. T/C.2/SR.198
(1954). See also Margolis, supra note 75, at 643, who concludes that "the geographic
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fact, the United States promptly took measures to settle all Mar-
shallese claims and gave assurances that accidents similar to that of
1954 could and would be prevented. The Trusteeship Council ac-
cepted those assurances on July 15, 1954.0
It can and has been argued in any event that this use of a trust
territory is entirely permissible under the Charter, the Trusteeship
Agreement, and the concept of a "strategic trust.''" The theory is
that the Agreement gives an administering authority "full powers
of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction" over the territory.
In addition, unlike the League of Nations Mandates arrangements,
it gives the United States the power to "establish naval, military and
air bases and to erect fortifications," "to station and employ armed
forces," and "to make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assist-
ance" in the territory." There are also broad powers with respect to
security." The exercise of these rights could clearly cause incon-
venience and loss to the islanders, and the United States, in exer-
cising them, has arranged to replace all lands taken from the public
domain and to pay full compensation for any financial loss." As
we have noted, on July 15, 1954, the Trusteeship Council, by nine
votes to three (Russia, India, Syria against) accepted a resolution
which vindicated the United States' position. In apparent anticipa-
tion of further testing, the resolution sounded a warning to the
United States to "take such precautions as will ensure that no in-
habitants of the Territory are again endangered. . . ."" This action
thus gives support to the view that testing in such an area is necessary
to the security interests of the United States and that, if precautions
are taken, the "rights" of the dependent peoples are subordinate to
the asserted needs of the Administering Authority.
It is clear that the decision makers in the United States are quite
alive to moral issues posed by the use of the Trust Territory as a
proving ground, whatever the status in international law of such
a use. Thus, in planning for possible new tests in the spring of 1962,
the Administration arranged with the United Kingdom for the use
quarantine and the physical consequences of thermonuclear tests in the Pacific Proving
Grounds are at variance with solemn treaty obligations of the United States under the U.N.
Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement." Id. at 645.
'5 See U.N. Trusteeship Council Off. Rec., 14th Sess. 561st meeting, para. 248 (1954),
and the joint draft resolution of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. No.
T/L.504 (1954).
' See McDougal & Schlei, supra note 75, at 655, 695.
2 Trusteeship Agreement art. 5.
' Trusteeship Agreement arts. 3, 5, 13.
84See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Interior, Annual Report on the Administration of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands 35 (1952); Standing Committee on Petitions, supra note
79, at 6-7.
"U.N. Doc. No. T/L.504, at 2 (1954).
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of the latter's tests area at Christmas Island in the Pacific and for the
use of the United States' Johnston Island as well. It was apparently
considered easier to bend the United States' atomic secrecy acts to
permit the British to monitor some of these proposed tests than to
explain anew the asserted right to use the Trust Territory." It should
also be noted that both of these sites are closer to Hawaii and thus
place the tests nearer the United States and further from the more
sensitive Asian nations."
France, like the United States, has reaped a harvest of special
criticism for the site of its nuclear tests in her North African de-
pendencies. The Fourteenth General Assembly had before it a
Moroccan request to discuss the "Question of French nuclear tests
in the Sahara.""8 It was argued that such tests would involve "many
dangers and grave consequences" to the Moroccan people in the
South Sahara. Twenty-two Afro-Asian states introduced a draft
resolution declaring that French tests would create "conditions of
danger in Africa" and would threaten the "health, safety and well-
being of the dependent peoples of Africa" who were a "special
responsibility of the United Nations."" Many of the sponsors were
particularly concerned because of the conflicting claims of sover-
eignty between France and Algeria over the territory.
The French representative argued that it would be unfair to
single out France when three other states had already conducted
tests. Also, the United States and Britain gave evidence that a
negligible health hazard would result. The reservations of some of
the original sponsors, as well as arguments in the debate of the First
Committee, led finally to a General Assembly resolution which
"requested," rather than "urged" France to refrain from testing
and which omitted reference to the creation of hazards in Africa."
France nevertheless proceeded to explode two nuclear devices on
February 13, and April 1, 1960. Subsequently, an Afro-Asian re-
quest for a special session of the Assembly failed to receive the
agreement of a majority of member states.'
Since that time France has exploded two more nuclear devices
above the Sahara, but she announced that the fourth was to be the
"6See N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1962, § 1, p. 30, col. 1 (editorial); N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,
1962, § 1, p. 8, col. 1.
87 For expressions of concern by the Japanese Government despite these precautions, see,
e.g., N.Y. Times, March 3, 1962, § 1, p. 2, col. 4.
"8U.N. Doc. No. A/4183 (1959).
"U.N. Doc. No. A/C.1/L.238/Add.1 (1959).
"'See, e.g., the Ghanian statement, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 14th Sess., 1st Comm.,
I044th meeting, para. 36 (A/C.1/SR) (1959).
' U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1379 (XIV) (Nov. 20, 1959).
2Yearbook of the United Nations 4 (1960).
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last above-ground test. In April 1961, in justifying the tests, Presi-
dent de Gaulle asserted that France would "observe the strictest
prudence in the tests" but that "as long as others have the means
to destroy her, it [is] necessary for her to have the means to defend
herself."93 Under present political conditions, it might seem ap-
propriate to conduct such further French testing as is deemed
necessary on some test sites other than the Sahara. Nevertheless,
France in fact conducted an underground test in the Sahara area in
the spring of 1962.
In summary, in the case of testing in a dependent area, even if we
assume that the effects of testing are limited to the test area alone,
we come for the first time to a clouded area in existing law. While
it seems doubtful that testing in a strategic trust territory or in a
dependent area over which a nation has clear sovereignty is illegal
as the law now stands, a sufficiently good argument to this effect
can be made so that, when it is added to the effect on world public
opinion, testing nations are now apt to seek less controversial sites.
For nations which are too small or too intensively populated to be
able to use domestic test sites, and which are without empty over-
seas areas in which to conduct tests, this same problem-finding a
permissible, non-inhabited test site-remains as a potentially im-
portant problem, which we will consider later.
C. The High Seas
As we have seen, the hydrogen bomb test conducted by the
United States in the Pacific in 1954 precipitated a major outcry
from Communist, pacifist, and humanitarian groups around the
world, not only because of injuries to the Marshallese but also be-
cause, through miscalculations, a number of Japanese fishermen were
injured and some quantities of fish were contaminated. We have
already discussed the tests in the Pacific from the point of view of
testing weapons in a trust territory. However, these tests, and their
effects, also brought into question the legality of a blocking off and
perhaps a contamination of large portions of the high seas and the
air space over the seas."'
The question of blocking off large areas of the seas-the Pacific
warning area instituted in 1954 covered about 400,000 square
" Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, Speeches and Press Confer-
ences, New York, No. 162, at 10, April 11, 1961.
"'The United Kingdom has also closed off portions of the Pacific to conduct hydrogen
bomb tests. See N.Y. Times, May 16, 1957, § 1, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 1, 1957,
§ 1, p. 1, col. 7; N.Y. Times, June 19, 1957, § 1, p. 1, col. 8; and N.Y. Times, Nov. 2,
1957, § 1, p. 1, col. 5.
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miles,"3 and that in 1962 covered some 1.2 million square miles in
all on the surface and 2 million square miles above 30,000 feet"'-for
the purposes of conducting nuclear tests has received able and ex-
haustive scholarly attention." In brief, those contending that such
tests are improper or illegal base their arguments on an interference
with the basic right of "freedom of the seas," on unwarranted pollu-
tion of the seas, and on interference with high seas fisheries. " They
suggest that "it may be contrary to the very principle of freedom of
the seas to encourage or permit action which amounts to an abuse
of a right which is apt to destroy the natural resources whose pres-
ervation and common use have been one of the main objects of the
doctrine of the freedom of the sea."99 Earl Jowitt remarked, for
example, in the House of Lords:
I am entirely satisfied that the United States, in conducting these ex-
periments, have taken every possible step open to them to avoid any
possible danger. But the fact that the area which may be affected is so
enormous at once brings this problem: that ships on their lawful oc-
casions may be going through these waters, and you have no right
under international law, I presume, to warn people off."'
Those arguing that tests areas involving a use of the high seas
are legally permissible suggest that blocking off areas of the seas
for testing is akin to the traditional and permissible use of the seas
for extensive fleet anchorages, naval maneuvers, parades, and target
practice, and for off-shore defense identification zones. These au-
thorities argue that the concept of "freedom of the seas" has never
overridden the right of a state to perform acts necessary to its self-
defense."' And, of course, the law of the seas itself has quite ap-
propriately been referred to as a "checkerboard of variegated regions
and legal rules."' '
9' U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners, pt. 2, No. 14, para. 1685 (April
3, 1954).
" See diagram, N.Y. Times, April 10, 1962, § 1, p. 4, col. 5.
"7See Reiff, The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea 353-68. (1959); Mar-
golis, supra note 75; McDougal & Schlei, supra note 75; McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb
Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 356 (1955); Van Zwanen-
berg, Interference with Ships on the High Seas, 10 Int'l and Comp. L.Q. 785, 796-98
(1961).
"See Margolis, supra note 75, at 630.
" The words are those in another context of the International Law Commission Report,
U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 8th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 18 (A/2456) (1953), cited by Mar-
golis, supra note 75, at 640.
"0 186 H.L. Deb. (5th ser.) 808-09 (1954).
101 Reiff, op. cit. supra note 97, at 365; McDougal & Schlei, supra note 75, at 65$.
... Staff of the Select Comm. on Astronautics and Space Exploration, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess., Survey of Space Law 3 (1958). See also Ward, Projecting the Law of the Sea into the
Law of Space, JAG J. 3 (March 1957).
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McDougal and Schlei suggest that the regime of the high seas is
not a static body of absolute rules, but rather a living, growing, cus-
tomary law, grounded in the claims, practices, and sanctioning ex-
pectations of nation-states and changing as the demands and expecta-
tions of decision-makers are changed by the exigencies of new social
and economic interests, by the imperatives of an ever developing tech-
nology and by other continually evolving conditions in the world
arena.03
Indeed, there is a great range of unilateral claims honored by the
practice of the nations including rights in territorial seas, con-
tiguous zones, and the like; security claims have in fact received a
special deference. Navigation and fishing have yielded to claims of
self-defense as in the case of the Virginius, which was seized by
Spanish forces on the high seas while carrying arms for Cuban
insurgents. ' Britain and the United States protested the summary
execution of a number of their nationals on board the Virginius but
admitted the legality of the seizure under the circumstances.0 '
Naval powers have throughout history asserted the right to the
exclusive use of portions of the high seas for conducting naval exer-
cises which sometimes lasted for periods ranging from a few hours
to years. Such claims have certainly been made by the United States,
Britain, Canada, Australia, and the Soviet Union, as well as other
powers, and seem to have rarely been questioned or even discussed.' °
There are also the minor but permanent preemptions by such struc-
tures as "Texas Towers," which house radar and defense equipment
in the high seas, and the extensive limitations imposed by the 30,000
square mile Atlantic missile testing range, which is used jointly by
the United States and Britain. The Soviet missile range in the Pacific
is likewise quite large." '
Thus, the line between high seas and territorial waters differs, in
practice, for different purposes. For example, in the language of the
British Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, which is still
in effect:
the rightful jurisdiction of Her Majesty . . . extends and has always
extended over the open sea adjacent to the coasts of the United Kingdom
.. McDougal & Schlei, supra note 75, at 6W5.
1042 Moore, Digest of International Law 895-903, 980-83 (1906).
'0' Id. at 983. See Hyde, International Law 68 (2d ed. 1945). For other examples, see
McDougal & Schlei, supra note 75, at 675.
... See the illustrations cited in text and notes in McDougal and Schlei, supra note 75,
at 678-82.
". Gt. Brit. Foreign Off. Treaty Ser. No. 74, at 14 (1950). On the missile testing
range, "ee Reiff, op. cit. supra note 97, at 368-71, and sources there cited. The missile range
has not elicited protests from other nations.
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and of all other parts of Her Majesty's Dominions, to such a distance as
is necessary for the defense and security of such dominions."'
This was echoed in President Roosevelt's perhaps over-expansive
statement that United States' territorial waters extend "as far as
our interests require.' '.. If "interests" is interpreted to mean "vital
national security interests,""' the statement appears to be in ac-
cordance with the way nations act, whatever may be the peacetime
regime of the seas.
Provided that the site used for the tests is carefully chosen, there
need not be much immediate interference with the use of the seas.
It has been pointed out, for example, that tests in the Trust Terri-
tory did not interfere with any established commercial shipping
line. In fact only the Guam-Wake Island air route had to be de-
flected, and the deviation simply made that journey some fifty miles
longer. Finally, only a relatively small percentage of even Japan's
fish catch is normally taken from that closed area."' Moreover, un-
like the waters immediately around the islands, the large restricted
area was closed only for the test period, which amounted to fifty-
seven days in 1954. However, the much more extensive area closed
off for the 1962 test series involved substantially more interference
with surface movement and included the air space normally used for
routes from Hawaii to Australia, New Zealand, and the Far East."'
Therefore, as far as the regime of the seas is at issue, it may be a
relatively insubstantial interference with maritime commerce. True,
when placed in effect the appropriation is preemptive, but for the
most part it is temporary. These measures appear always to have
been considered permissible, as with fleet maneuvers, when they are
important to national security and reasonable in nature. The justifi-
cation is that there is a right to prepare for self-defense-a claim
not easily brushed aside in the nuclear-space age, especially since the
United Nations Charter makes an express exception for the "inherent
right of . . . self-defense" as an integral part of the general limita-
tion on the use of violence in international affairs."M
It is true that in Secretary of State Webster's classic words, the
". 41-42 Vict., c. 73 (1878). See also remarks of the United Kingdom representative,
U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 11th Sess., 6th Comm., 492d meeting (1956).
'O Quoted in Masterson, The Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Law, 26 A.B.A.J.
860-61 (1940).
"OId. at 862.
"' Reiff, op. cit. supra note 97, at 365; McDougal & Schlei, supra note 75, at 682.
11 N.Y. Times, April 10, 1962, § 1, p. 4, col. 1.
1 U.N. Charter art. 51. See the remarks of the British Representative relative to the




right of self-defense outside the national borders has generally been
limited in law "to cases in which the necessity .. .is instant, over-
whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."" 4 In the nuclear-missile age, with the possibility of
destroying a nation half the world away within an hour after an
attack is launched, states are more apt to base their legal position
on the analysis of Elihu Root. Root, as early as 1914, could refer
to the right of self-protection as being necessarily recognized in in-
ternational law; as extending "in its effect beyond the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of the State exercising it"; and as giving
"every sovereign state the right to protect itself by preventing a
condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself."....
Since the days of the last Pacific tests, the nations of the world
have begun the ratifying process on a series of conventions which
relate to the seas. While the United States has not yet ratified the
agreements, the Convention on the High Seas, signed at Geneva on
April 29, 1958, was adopted as purporting to be "generally declara-
tory of established principles of international law.""... Article 2 of
the Convention provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal states:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general prin-
ciples of international law, shall be exercised by all states with reasonable
regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom
of the high seas.
The Convention also includes an article dealing with radioactive
pollution. Thus, article 25 provides:
1. Every state shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from
the dumping of radioactive waste....
114 The statement was made with respect to the Caroline incident. See Communication,
Webster to Fox, April 24, 1841, 29 Brit. & For. State Papers 1138.
"' Address by Elihu Root, President of the American Society of International Law,
quoted in The Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 Am. J. Int'l L. 427, 432 (1914).
... Preamble. On the status in law of the Conventions, see Jessup, The Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea, 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 730 (1958); Jessup, The United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 234 (1959). The Conventions are reprinted




2. All states shall co-operate with the competent international organi-
zations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the
seas or airspace above, resulting from any activities with radioactive
materials or other harmful agents.
The Conference did not come to any specific conclusions with
respect to testing. In the course of discussion, nearly a dozen states
expressed support for barring nuclear tests at sea." ' However, it
was not asserted by non-Communist states that present law now
barred such tests."' Further, a proposal"' sponsored by Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union to include a
paragraph to the effect that "states are bound to refrain from test-
ing nuclear weapons on the high seas" was not accepted by the
Conference, the feeling being that it was inappropriate to deal with
the matter outside of a more general disarmament context. " ' Rather,
in a Resolution on Nuclear Tests on the High Seas, adopted on April
27, 1958,121 the Conference recognized "that there is a serious and
genuine apprehension on the part of many states that nuclear ex-
plosions constitute an infringement of the freedom of the seas,"
but in view of the United Nations General Assembly's continuing
interest in the matter as part of the general disarmament question,
the Conference merely decided "to refer this matter to the General
Assembly for appropriate action." In another resolution, which
dealt with pollution of the high seas by radioactive materials through
"disposal of radioactive wastes in the seas," the Conference did point
out the widely held fear that radioactivity may "adversely affect
man and his marine resources."''
It cannot actually be said that the work of the Conference has
altered the position in international law of the issue of testing on
the high seas. The Conference certainly did indicate the genuine
fears of many nations that human health and sea resources might
be affected. It provided in article 25 of the Convention on the High
Seas that all states should seek to prevent the pollution "of the seas
or airspace above, resulting from any activities with radioactive ma-
terials. . . ." (Emphasis added.) In addition, it reaffirmed in article 2
of that Convention the freedoms of navigation on, fishing in, and
.. These states included Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, India, Japan,
Romania, the Soviet Union, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. See U.N. Conference on the Law of
the Sea, Off. Rec. Vol. IV, 2d Cimm. (Doc. A/Conf.13/40), at 9-12, 15-17, 19, 21, 24,
31, 44-46, 49 (1958).
".. See remarks of the Indian representative, id. at 48.
"' U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.13/C.2/L.30 (1959).
"'U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.13/C.2/L.30 (1959).
121U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.13/L.56, at 2 (1958).




flight over the high seas, although the same article noted that freedom
can only be exercised "with reasonable regard to the interests of
other states."
In conclusion, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain,
in closing off large portions of the high seas for nuclear tests and
missile ranges have not claimed sovereignty or denied the existence
of the usual freedoms of the high seas. They have only claimed the
right to interfere, for limited periods, with the use of a portion of
the high seas in pursuit of another vital interest, that of national
defense and security. To the extent that foreign nationals, their
property, and the world's resources are not subjected to "unreason-
able" injury, this position appears justified in current international
law practice. Again, it must be stressed that we are thus far dealing
only with short-range, close-in effects of nuclear tests and are post-
poning the consideration of deleterious effects on man and nature
until later.
D. Free Airspace
Just as airspace above national territory is universally accepted
as being under the sovereignty of the subjacent state, the airspace
above the high seas is considered "free" for the passage of aircraft
of all nations in accepted air law concepts. ' The regime of the high
seas is, therefore, generally considered to apply to the airspace above
the seas as well.' Indeed, it is common practice to talk of the two
together for many purposes-thus article 25 of the Convention on
the High Seas of 1958 requires states to co-operate in preventing
radioactive pollution "of the seas or airspace above."
That the atmosphere may be contaminated by tests at sea is com-
mon knowledge. It was demonstrated vividly by the United States
experiments in 1954. The AEC reported then that the atmosphere
above "7,000 square miles of territory downwind from the point
of burst was so contaminated" from radioactive fallout that survival
in the area would have depended upon "prompt evacuation of the
area or upon taking shelter and other protective measures."' ' As
noted, the fallout endangered United States personnel and several
hundred Marshallese when a shift in the wind exposed other islands
to the hazard. It appears that one death may have been caused as
123 Hyde, International Law 604 (2d ed. 1945); Jessup & Taubenfeld, Controls for
Outer Space 201-03 (1959); 1 Oppenheim, International Law 517 (8th ed. Lauterpacht
195 5).
11" For citations, see Briggs, The Law of Nations 323-26 (2d ed. 1952), and the report
by E. Pepin, The Law of the Air, 1 U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea 64 (U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.13/4) (1958).
12s See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1955, § 1, p. 18, col. 4.
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well as several cases of illness among the crews of two Japanese
vessels at some distance from Bikini; and fish in an extended area
were made radioactive for many months."'
Here then we face the problem of contamination of the atmos-
phere not over national or even "quasi-national" territory but over
the high seas. In this case, even if we again assume that contamina-
tion does not reach any other nations' territory or airspace, we still
have the question of making unusable, at least temporarily, the
"free" airspace over the high seas. In this sense, the problem is
identical to that raised by closing off portions of the seas themselves
for testing.
In the classic concept, freedom of the airspace over the high seas
is limited, as is the freedom to use the seas, to peaceful, or at least
to non-threatening, uses.1" ' Airspace may also be closed off, at least
briefly, by aerial military maneuvers, just as sea areas are restricted
when fleets practice war games. Exemplary of this practice are the
United States, Soviet, and British missile range tests which endanger
and pre-empt airspace over the Atlantic and the Pacific and also the
impact areas on the seas.
Further, claims to a right of self-protection in airspace at distances
well beyond national territory have repeatedly been made. The Air
Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) maintained by the United
States and Canada, for example, require that aircraft approaching
these countries identify themselves at a distance of one hour's flight
time." With today's jets, this can mean distances of 600 miles or
so while mach III planes, due on commercial lines before 1970,
would, under present rules, have to be cleared at 1,800 miles off-
shore. These nations do not claim sovereignty, but they claim the
sovereign right to control access to their territory in the airspace
... For studies of the effects of this fallout see AEC, Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation
on Human Beings: A Report on the Marshallese and Americans Accidentally Exposed to
Radiation from Fallout and a Discussion of Radiation Injury in Being (1956); AEC,
Radioactive Contamination of Certain Areas in the Pacific Ocean from Nuclear Tests (1957).
On movement of atomic debris generally, consult the papers entered by List, Annotated
Bibliography on the Transport and Deposition of Atomic Debris, AEC Pub'n (1956).
127 Hyde, op. cit. supra note 123, at 604; Jessup & Taubenfeld, op. cit. supra note 123,
at 201-03.
.s See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 64 Stat. 825 (1950), 49 U.S.C. §§ 701-05
(1952); 20 Fed. Reg. 8184 (1955); 15 Fed. Reg. 9180 (1950); Reiff, op. cit. supra note 98,
at 365-68; Canada Dep't of Transport, Rules for the Security Control of Air Traffic
(1954); Cooper, Space Above the Seas, JAG J. 8, 36 (Feb. 1959); Martial, State Control
of the Air Space Over the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 30 Can. B. Rev. 245
(1952); Murchison, The Contiguous Air Space Zone in International Law, 1956 Report of
Canadian Dep't of Nat'l Defense 79-94; U.S. Naval War College, International Law
Situations 1957, apps. I, II, at 577.
On the right of self-defense of a subjacent state, even without claims of sovereignty, see
Craig, National Sovereignty at High Altitudes, 24 J. Air L. & Coin. 384, 388 (1957).
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far out over the high seas. Violators of these regulations may, on
conviction, be forced to pay fines and serve prison terms, and they
run the more immediate risk of interception by military aircraft or
missiles. Nevertheless, national claims of this type do not appear to
have elicited any protest.
In summary, these practices suggest that when issues of self-
preservation are raised to justify the need for testing, it is difficult
to demonstrate that the resulting temporary interference with free
passage through airspace over the high seas is illegal per se-just as
it is difficult to make that showing with respect to testing on the
seas. Once again it should be noted that this conclusion is based on
the premise that there is only local and temporary pollution of a
part of the airspace.
E. High Altitudes And Outer Space
The use of outer space as a "site" for nuclear tests has been sug-
gested as feasible for particular types of testing and as danger-
free as far as contaminating the earth or the atmosphere is concerned.
Dr. Teller, for example, commented in 1959 on the possibility of
exploding a nuclear device at one hundred million miles from earth
to test Einstein's theory of relativity and the nature and complete-
ness of the vacuum in space.' This type of testing was also sup-
ported by Commissioner Libby of the Atomic Energy Commission.'30
Both men expected fallout on earth to be non-existent or infinitesimal.
There is, of course, no single scientific definition of where airspace
ends and outer space begins, nor has there been any international
political agreement on this question. 3' However, this article does
not pursue that issue any further, since it can be settled sooner or
later either by the nations' drawing an arbitrary line or lines, or by
treating activities in their entirety and applying the same rules to
them wherever they take place, or by some combination of these
two principles.
For purposes of discussion, it is necessary to consider two types
of tests: one taking place in outer space at such a distance from the
earth that it has no potentially harmful effects at all on the earth
or its atmosphere; the other at such a distance that it may well be
.' N.Y. Times, April 18, 1959, § 1, p. 1, col. 7.
3°N.Y. Times, May 9, 1959, § 1, p. 2, col. 7.
'' For a survey of the problem see Jessup & Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer Space
204-09 (1959); Taubenfeld, A Regime for Outer Space, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 129, 137 (1961).
The question is of importance in that airspace is now conclusively accepted as being
subject to national sovereignty while the regime for outer space is now in process of
formulation. See note 136 infra and accompanying text on the United Nations resolution
0 f December 20, 1961.
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deemed to have taken place in outer space though some effect is felt
on earth.
Testing so deep in space that no practical effects will be felt on
earth may be attempted within the next few years. Critics point
to the difficulties and cost of the experiments and the fact that great
distances make observations more difficult. However, at present, the
objections to tests in other places-pollution and interference with
transit and the like-do not apply to this type of activity in deep
space.
The Geneva Conference of Experts, discussed earlier, 32 considered
the question of explosions in outer space in 1958 but made no specific
recommendations, since at the time the problem was considered
academic. United States high altitude tests in the late summer of
1958 showed that such tests were feasible,'33 and the United States
then even suggested, on April 13, 1959, that a ban on atomic ex-
plosions in the "atmosphere" (and under water) be a first step
towards a general nuclear test-ban treaty. On May 5, 1959, Presi-
dent Eisenhower asked for "early discussion of concrete measures
for high altitude detection."'34
The banning of high altitude nuclear explosions subsequently
became an agreed subject for study by Soviet, British, and American
scientists at Geneva in June, 1959, and expert sessions were held on
this special problem in June and July. The experts suggested a
satellite-ground station set-up to deal with the relatively easier task
of detecting explosions at least in "near-in" space, but the talks
made no further progress and no treaty or accepted rule on testing
of this type has emerged.
At the same time, notice should be taken of the General Assembly
resolution of December 20, 1961, entitled "International Cooperation
in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space."'' That resolution was adopted
unanimously, including the affirmative votes of the two great space
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In attempting to
set some basis for future international activities in outer space, the
Assembly "commended" to all states for their guidance in the
exploration and use of outer space the following principles:
(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations,
applies to outer space and celestial bodies;
"2 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
133See notes 137, 138 infra and accompanying text.
'. See 40 Dep't State Bull. 826, 827 (1959).
"" U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1721 (XVI) (1961).
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(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use
by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject
to national appropriation.136
The "commendation" does not represent an already accepted rule
of international law, but in view of the wide acceptance of the
resolution, it may well be that these principles will find acceptance
as a basis for the needed further development of a regime for
outer space.
Even if we were to proceed on an assumption that the two stated
principles are now law, we would still face the general problem pre-
sented in this discussion. If nuclear tests are not now contrary to
international law when conducted on earth, these principles will not
bar them when conducted in outer space. If such tests are now totally
barred by international law, then testing in outer space is also an
improper activity. If the law now bars such tests only when they
have certain effects on persons or property, a more pragmatic ap-
proach will be necessary for outer space activities. However, in any
event, no formal international ban limited to deep space tests now
exists.
An important dilemma must be noted. If indeed nations must
test for valid reasons of national security, and if deep space can be
shown to be safe for nuclear testing, perhaps morally it is the only
place where tests should be permitted, rather than banned. It will,
of course, be very difficult for small nations to reach the space test-
ing area, whereas they can all reach the seas. Perhaps nuclear sharing,
or aiding such nations by giving them spacecraft, will prove more
satisfactory than permitting a growing use of the seas or remote
earth areas for nuclear tests.
Moving closer to earth, we find that the explosion of nuclear
devices carried by rockets to very high altitudes, on the order of
80 to 300 miles, has already caused interference with telecommuni-
cations facilities on earth, auroral glows, and a thin band of radiation
encircling the earth. When the United States exploded such devices
over Johnston Island in the Pacific on August 1 and 12, 1958, and
during Project Argus in the Atlantic on August 27, 30, and Septem-
ber 6, 1958, communications in the areas were knocked out from
several hours to a day, and radio contact was cut off between the
United States and Japan for several hours.' 7 The fields of radiation
131 Ibid.
... See House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, Nuclear Explosions in Space, H.R.
Rep. No. 575, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 23, 1959); N.Y. Times, March 19, 1959. § 1,
p. 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, March 20, 1959, § 1, p. 1, col. 8, and p. 10, col. 1; N.Y.Times,
March 25, 1959, § 1, p. 16, col. 1 (Dep't of State comment).
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thus created persisted for several weeks. Radar was blurred too,
leading to the speculation that this technique can be developed for
wartime uses, since the experiments demonstrated that certain effects
of the explosions followed well-defined paths through space around
the earth. An explosion over the Indian Ocean, for example, would
have effects in the Moscow area, causing radio static which "can
interfere with radio communication and . . . in principle with radar
operation." '' Thus, this same experiment has been labeled "a boldly
conceived experiment in pure science of immense geophysical propor-
tions, labeled by some publicists as the greatest scientific experiment
in all history," while at the same time constituting a key military
experiment which "might affect the balance of military power in
the new technologies of missiles and space travel....9
Such experiments are probably in what is considered "outer space."
They presumably present little or no threat of fallout contamina-
tion, yet their other distasteful effects are noticeable on earth. They
can "in principle" cause radio and radar interference in other states,
at least for short periods, and thus create the fear of an imminent
attack. Experiments designed actually to test the effects in other
countries would thus be serious and even unfriendly acts.
Based on the principle of absolute sovereignty in the airspace,
states may object to penetration of their airspace by radiation. Such
objections have been raised with respect to penetration by Herzian
waves used for radio transmissions; however, the enforcement of
"rights" in this field presents difficult problems, and the delivery
of protests and the use of jamming techniques represent the limits
of current protection of borders against unwelcome radio trans-
missions.14 Nevertheless, the principle of absolute national sovereignty
is invoked in these cases and may well be asserted again if tests in-
volving the penetration of national boundaries by radar-interfering
radiation were initiated. Obviously the fact that the explosions were
in outer space or were "over" the seas or even "over" the territory
of the testing state would not insulate the experimenter from com-
plaint by an affected state. Intentional or "reckless" interference,
even though of short duration, with national communications and,
perhaps, defense systems, might well form the basis of an inter-
national claim on the analogy of Herzian wave penetration, though
138 Testimony of Dr. Herbert York before House Space Comm., reported in N.Y.
Times, June 21, 1959, 5 1, p. 39, col. 5.
'"H.R. Rep. supra note 137, at 5.
140 See, e.g., General Communications Regulations attached to the International Tele-
communications Convention, Madrid, Dec. 9, 1932, and Revisions of Feb. 1 and April 9,
1938; European Broadcasting Convention, June 19, 1933, and Sept. 15, 1948, CMD No.
7946, T.S. No. 30 (1950); Aaronson, $Pace Law, Int'l Relations 423 (April 1958).
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as with the wave interference, it is doubtful that unfriendly states
will be able to do more than protest and take similar counter-
measures. The present international legal order is simply too in-
adequate to cope with the new technology of weapons and testing,
even when pertinent legal analogies do exist.
F. The Antarctic
Whatever the rule elsewhere, the major powers, including all
present possessors of nuclear weapons, have by treaty expressly
barred themselves from conducting nuclear tests or indeed from ex-
ploding any nuclear devices in the Antarctic. In a treaty"' signed on
December 1, 1959, and now in force between Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the
Union of South Africa, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the
United States, it is provided in article 5 that:
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radio-
active waste material shall be prohibited.
2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements con-
cerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the
disposal of radioactive waste material . . . the rules established under
such agreements shall apply in Antarctica.
For treaty purposes, Antarctica is defined in article 6 as "the area
south of 600 South Latitude, including all ice shelves ... "
For the first time in history, there has been a multi-lateral ban
on nuclear explosions. It is not at all certain that any nation actually
planned tests in the Antarctic, for that place is incredibly remote,
hard to reach, and difficult enough to live in-let alone conduct
delicate experiments. It was from time to time rumored that the
United States or the Soviet Union was contemplating such action,
but these stories were repeatedly denied.'42 Actually, some of the
critics of testing in other areas had suggested the Antarctic as a
possible site for essential tests because of its remoteness. 42
A ban on testing was not included in the original draft of the
proposed Antarctic treaty but was added to meet the concern ex-
pressed by South American states in particular.'44 Since winds in-
14'T.I.A.S. No. 4780 (effective June 23, 1961). For text of the treaty and discussion,
see Taubenfeld, A Treaty for Antarctica, Int'l Conc. No. 531 (Jan. 1961).
... See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1954, § 1, p. 8, col. 6.
.. Margolis, supra note 75, at 647. The Soviet Union has apparently conducted at
least some of its tests in the Soviet Arctic sector. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1954, S 1, p. 4,
col. 3. This does not appear to have lessened the fallout hazard since most of the world's
population lives in the Northern Hemisphere and is affected by polar wind currents.
... Hearings on the Antarctic Treaty Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 42 (1960).
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evitably circulate northward from Antarctica, fallout from atmos-
pheric and surface tests presents a special potential hazard in the
Southern Hemisphere. When the ban proposal was first made at
the conference which drafted the treaty, the Soviet representative
had to wait for instructions from Moscow before agreeing. However,
this maneuver was interpreted at the time as a desire to avoid
jeopardizing the Soviet bargaining position at the Geneva atomic
talks, which were then in progress, rather than as an indication of
any actual intention to use Antarctica as a test area. Thus, agreement
was ultimately reached. The test ban portion of the Treaty was then
used to help "sell" the Treaty in Argentina and Chile, where feelings
are strong over the national claims to ownership of parts of the
Antarctic, but where fear of nuclear testing is also prevalent.''
It has been repeatedly suggested, as we have seen, that Antarctica
is so desolate that testing might be conducted there with greater
safety than anywhere else on earth, and that without a world-wide
ban on testing, it is unwise to give up the right to test there. It
has also been suggested that, in this case, a ban on even the peaceful
use of nuclear explosions may prove costly-i.e., that thermonuclear
explosions beneath the surface of Antarctica's ice might be the best
way to open more of the continent for mining or other develop-
ment.' Present indications from the series of underground tests
conducted by the United States suggest that dangers of high local
radioactivity might make such programs difficult in the near future,
but the issue of fruitful peaceful use which it raises is interesting.
In any case, the fears of nations in the Southern Hemisphere,
whether justifiable or not, are of real importance, while the tech-
nological loss is problematic at best. Therefore, we may conclude that
for the nations involved, there is a treaty rule prohibiting any nuclear
explosions in this large but remote area and that this rule is backed
by an unlimited right of each nation to inspect and observe the
installations of the others.""
The Treaty also raises an interesting question with respect to non-
party states since in article 10 it states:
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts,
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no
one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or
purposes of the present Treaty.
... N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1961, 5 1, p. 13, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1961, § 1, p. 1,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1962, § 1, p. 4, col. 1.
'" See Hearings, supra note 144, at 5, 6. (Sen. Engle). The use of nuclear devices for
developmental purposes has already been suggested for the Arctic.
147 Antarctic Treaty art. 7.
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Thus the parties agree, among other things, to prevent other states
from testing in the Antarctic. This is important in the sense that,
as a basic tenet of nuclear-age law, we find the concept that the ban
must be universally binding to be at all useful. At the same time it
raises anew the question, posed also by a possible ban on the use of
outer space for testing, as to where the powers presently lacking
atomic weapons are to test if we do not achieve a ban on the pro-
duction of such weapons as well. If we remove the "safe" remote
areas, can these nations in fact accept the present nuclear oligopoly,
or if they respect these limited bans, will we not be forcing them to
use areas more dangerous to mankind?
IV. INJURIES CAUSED BY NUCLEAR TESTING
We must turn now to the more widespread effects of testing-i.e.,
those occurring more remotely in time and space. Most of the pre-
ceding discussion has been concerned with the legality of nuclear
tests in relation to the "place" where they are conducted. As ex-
perience with testing has already shown, once the effects of testing
nuclear devices are felt in the territory of a nation other than the
testing state, or cause injury, present or future, to persons or property
of a nationality other than that of the testing state, testing rights
may conflict with other international tenets. While the precise prob-
lem is new and is especially difficult in view of the potential and
perhaps incalculable damage done to future generations, ' there are
several more prosaic situations known to international law which
must be considered because of their relevance to this issue.
The question of damage done in one nation by instrumentalities
operating in another has already received a limited amount of inter-
national attention. The best known illustration is the Trail Smelter
Case... in which an arbitral tribunal awarded $78,000 to the United
States for damage caused to land, trees, and crops in the State of
Washington from sulphur dioxide fumes emitted by a Canadian
smelting company. The tribunal held that "no State has the right
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
... Experience with the Japanese survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki indicated that sterility, genetic mutations, cataracts, susceptibility to secondary
bacterial infection, etc. may be expected from too great an exposure to radiation from
nuclear devices just as they result from overexposure to radiation from other natural or
man-made sources. As we have seen, the limits of human toleration, and the precise future
effects of continued exposure of the world's population to radiation and its products from
testing, remain matters of scientific dispute. See note 23 supra and accompanying text,
and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, The Effects of Atomic Weapons passim (1950).




injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties
or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence."'' . Even here
though, the tribunal employed a "balancing approach" and permitted
the smelter to continue to operate and emit fumes at what was ap-
parently felt to be a reasonable level."'
In a similar way, the Supreme Court of the United States has, in
disputes between the states of the Union, established the principle
that a state may be enjoined from conduct, such as the polluting of
interstate waters, if, but only if, it can be clearly and fully proven
that the unwholesome effects of the conduct are of sufficiently
"serious magnitude."'' . The Court has emphasized its reluctance as
a general policy to enjoin action undertaken by a "quasi-sovereign"
state.'"
Legal scholars have already argued that the Trail Smelter Case
provides an appropriate precedent for above-ground nuclear testing,
with its effects felt around the world."' Two factors familiar to
lawyers must be overcome even if that case is taken as apposite. First,
there is the problem of "serious consequence," which is presumably
solved when a death, injury to a person, or substantial property
damage is shown. Second, there is the issue of establishing the source
of the injury "by clear and convincing evidence," which is far more
difficult. Even if it can someday be established that a rise in radiation
levels of precisely "x" units will cause certain deleterious conse-
quences, if extensive tests by Nation 1 raise the world radiation level
to "x minus one," and Nation 2, to keep militarily abreast of Nation
1, then tests and raises the level to "x," which nation is legally re-
sponsible for injuries caused? What happens to the right of self-
defense of Nation "N"? Moreover, if, as seems likely, the effects
show up only over generations, who can seek recompense? Also,
which nation is responsible for these additional deaths or injuries?
As rational human beings, it is clear that any rise in radiation
levels should be avoided. Nevertheless, if a nation believes that its
survival is involved in testing, it will assert the right to test even if
it becomes clearer than it now is that specific and demonstrable in-
juries will follow. Moreover, it will assert this right of self-defense
"Ild. at 1965.
"' Id. at 1974.
"' See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921). Cf. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), where the
Court found that na harm had been proven.
113 New York v. New Jersey, supra note 152.
14 See, e.g., Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 Yale
L.J. 629, 641 (1955).
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even against the claims of admitted victims, though it may well offer
compensation of some sort as a matter of grace, just as the United
States did with respect to her nuclear testing.' 5
It has also been argued that in international law there is a doctrine
of "abuse of rights," which makes a state liable for indemnity when
it exploits a right it possesses under international law "in such a
way as to inflict upon another State an injury which cannot be
justified by a legitimate consideration of its own advantage.""15 The
International Law Commission has stated that this doctrine "is sup-
ported by judicial and other authority,''. but it remains a con-
troversial concept in law. Even if we grant the testing state the
right to test in its own defense, it is at least arguable that the only
damage made permissible by this necessity would be to nationals and
property of the threatening state. If, for example, it is the United
States which the Soviet Union fears, why should Japan and indeed
all other nations be obliged to bear the heavy load of fallout which
testing in Siberia apparently causes? Even if Japan is considered as
allied to the United States, claims by allies of the testing state, and by
the clearly non-aligned nations, if they are subjected to radiation
hazards, will still be possible under this theory.
Another activity of an analogous nature which has been subjected
to international scrutiny is the pollution of the world's oceans. 5
Although for years discussion of this problem was confined to the
discharge of oil by ships, the atomic age brought with it new fears
caused by the disposal of atomic waste materials at sea. A London
Conference in 1954, for example, produced an International Con-
vention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil which dealt
with the oil problem by setting up zones where the discharge of oil
would be prohibited.5 ' It provided further for investigation by the
flag nation and penalties against an offending vessel. Many states, like
the United States, also enforce their own codes on pollution by oil.
Also, the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1958
provided, in article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas, that
155 See note 167 infra and accompanying text, and the statements of Premier Khrushchev
and President Kennedy, notes 3 and 4 supra and accompanying text.
... See I Oppenheim, International Law 345 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
... International Law Commission Report, supra note 99, at 18.
ass See Reiff, The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea (1959).
"
5
"The Convention is T.I.A.S. No. 4900 (effective July 26, 1958). The United States is
a party (with certain reservations) as are (as of Jan. 1, 1962) Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Fed. Rep. Germany, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden,
United Kingdom. In general, see Memorandum by the U.N. Secretariat, Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, I U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea 169 (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.13/8) (1958).
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Every state shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas
by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the
exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil . . .
It must also be recalled that article 25 expressly states that:
1. Every state shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from
the dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any standards
and regulations which may be formulated by the competent interna-
tional organizations.
2. All states shall cooperate with the competent international organi-
zations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas
or airspace above, resulting from any activities with radioactive ma-
terials or other harmful agents.
Further, while the Conference left the problem of nuclear tests
at sea to the General Assembly, it did adopt a Resolution on the
Pollution of the High Seas by Radioactive Materials which dealt
with "disposal of radioactive wastes in the sea.'.'. This Resolution
also points up the widely held fears that radioactivity may "ad-
versely affect man and his marine resources" and indicates that states-
men, when not faced with the issue of national security which is
posed by a test ban, do indeed take the question of man-made
pollution by radioactivity seriously.
Actually, prior to these conventions, no international tribunal
ever held a state liable in damages for polluting the seas, nor has a
state ever been ordered to desist, though the concept of liability has
received scholarly support.' 6' While the prescriptions and their effect
remain untested, it is clear that radioactive pollution, with its long-
lasting effects and its ability actually to alter nature through causing
mutations, is not the same thing as pollution by oil.
It is true too that even in private law, the concepts of balancing
of interests and of reasonableness have entered the field of pollution
of waters and of trespass by smoke, fumes, and vapors."2 In the
international arena, it has been pointed out that "any balancing of
interests which failed to take account of the demands for security
which states must make in the contemporary world would, of course,
be most unrealistic.""' 3 Of course, as Hitler demonstrated, the de-
mand for "security" may serve only to conceal rapacity and in-
difference to human suffering.
160 Adopted April 27, 1958. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.13/L.56, at 3, (1958).
.. See Hyde, International Law 757-58 (2d ed. 1945); McDougal & Schlei, The
Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L.J. 648,
690 (1955).
.. See, e.g., Restatement, Torts §§ 826-28, 830-31 (1939).
113 McDougal & Schlei, supra note 161, a: 691.
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It has also been suggested that even if, for some reason, a state is
held liable for damages caused to persons or property, this does not
mean that the state can properly be barred from continuing the act
if it is of great national importance. We are familiar in domestic
practice with equity decisions which permit an important activity to
continue though it produces some degree of damage to others' in-
terests, and though compensation is ordered. This is particularly true
where an important public interest is balanced against private rights
and where a governmental entity is the offender.' 4 Of course, these
cases have not involved the right to kill or maim the living, much
less the unborn.
In a similar fashion, after injury to Japanese citizens and eco-
nomic interests in 1954, the Japanese Government accepted financial
redress in the form of $2 million in damages "without reference"
to questions of legal liability. Moreover, Japan refused to request that
the United States discontinue its tests, and Foreign Minister Okazaki
indicated that such a request could not properly be made unless the
Soviet Union could also be brought to the point of abandoning tests.
He actually supported the tests on the ground that they "will con-
tribute to world peace."'' Other friendly governments also refused to
request a halt in testing."'
V. CONCLUSION
What emerges from this survey of the law must be considered as
an unsatisfactory state of affairs from the point of view of anyone
who pays heed to the agreed position of scientific investigators that
unnecessary additions to current radiation levels are unwise. It may
be that testing to date, and even some new test series, present no
actual threat to human life not directly in the path of immediate
fallout. However, it may be that we have already maimed thousands
..4 See Restatement, Torts §§ 936, 942 (1939). See also, e.g., Harrisonville v. W. S.
Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933).
It is true that where a "semi-sovereign" state is the complaining party, there is less
tendency to "balance," but the reluctance to enjoin a useful activity, even where a state's
interests are involved, still persists. See North Carolina v. Tennessee, 240 U. S. 650 (1916);
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915). Compare also the position urged by
the United States in the Trail Smelter Case, the award cited supra note 149, at 1962-63,
to the effect that a state may not continue an activity which inflicts a legally compensable
injury. The arbitrators did not decide this point, and although it appears doubtful as a
rule of law, these assertions may return to embarrass the United States.
... See N.Y. Times, April 2, 1954, § 1, p. 4, col. 6; Manchester Guardian, March 24,
1954, p. 1, col. 2.
.S These included the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, Belgium, New
Zealand, Republic of China, Haiti, El Salvador. See N.Y. Herald Tribune, April 10, 1954,
p. 2, col. 7; N.Y. Times, April 6, 1954, § 1, p. 12, cols. 3, 5; N.Y. Times, April 7, 1954,
S 1, p. 3, col. 1; U.N. Trusteeship Council Off. Rec. 14th Sess., 561st meeting, paras.
244-48 (1954); Standing Committee on Petitions, U.N. Doc. No. T/C.2/SR.198 (1954).
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who are still unborn. Whatever the effects, since states now having
nuclear weapons still consider tests necessary to national security-in
order to keep up with the opposition, or to perfect new or lighter
weight weapons, or to develop "clean" weapons, or to experiment
with anti-missile missile warheads-and since the remaining states
believe it important to acquire a nuclear weapons potential, tests
will continue.
It is not that nations do not recognize the risks involved in atomic
radiation. Tests have been banned in the Antarctic; the pollution of
the seas by radioactive waste has been dealt with by treaty; nuclear
disasters resulting from peaceful uses of atomic energy have been
foreseen and provided against by insurance and indemnity programs
in the United States, Western Europe, and elsewhere;' the subject,
for various reasons, has repeatedly been pressed in United Nations
discussions and in disarmament negotiations; and to the extent that
demonstrable injuries have resulted from testing, compensation has
been paid, at least by the United States, although purportedly as
a matter of grace rather than obligation. Yet with the exception of
an area like the Antarctic, there is now no positive tenet of inter-
national law barring testing per se. Moreover, as with all interna-
tional rules, when the issue of national security is placed on one
side of the scales, there does not seem to be even a possibility of
arriving at a more effective limitation as to place of occurrence or
the like. A nation which faces the loss of thousands and even millions
of its own people in a war will unhesitatingly risk the possible
sacrifice of some unknown few, or even many, if it is convinced
its security is at stake.
This does not mean that the law gives blanket approval to state
action, however injurious, though it does sometimes seem that way.
Already, twenty-one nations have, in a draft resolution on the 1961
Report of UNSCEAR, marked their feeling that
both concern for the future of mankind and the fundamental prin-
ciples of international law impose a responsibility on all States con-
cerning actions which might have harmful biological consequences for
the existing and future generation of peoples of other States, by increas-
ing the levels of radioactivity fallout ... '"
The issue, of course, will not be resolved in terms of existing law.
National states are never in fact pacifist. Consequently, they can-
not tolerate grave but avoidable imbalances in their ability to defend
... See Note, Nuclear Liability Legislation in the United States and Europe, 13 Stan.
L. Rev. 865 (1961).
.ea U.N. Doc. No. A/SPC/L.69 (1961). Neither the Soviet Union nor the United
States was a sponsor.
[Vol. 16
NUCLEAR TESTING
themselves. Any outright, complete, simple test ban proposal which
is not part of an effective nuclear disarmament program, or a pro-
gram for the sharing of strategic information, could not be honored
indefinitely. Self-policed denials of power, like the League of Nations
Mandates provisions barring the fortification and military use of
the areas held in "sacred trust," have never been honored for long.
The larger nations who do not now have nuclear capabilities will
sooner or later make their bid for equality and membership into the
ranks of the elite.
An agreed ban by treaty on testing between, let us say, Russia,
Britain, France, and the United States would doubtless be intoler-
able to the emerging industrial powers in the present state of world
affairs. If Communist China feels that she needs nuclear weapons,
it is unwise to assume that, while the United States, the Soviet Union,
and other powers possess them, China will rest content without
the weapons even though she possesses the knowledge and technology
to become a nuclear power. Then, if China performs tests and has
the weapons, it will probably prove impossible and probably unwise
for an Indian Government not to follow the same path. As we have
already seen, these non-nuclear powers are well aware that a test
ban, without nuclear disarmament, would simply freeze them out
of nuclear technology while others increased their stocks.
One dangerous alternative is to give all major powers nuclear
technology, and perhaps weapons as well, so that testing will be un-
necessary-that is, if these nations believed nothing had been held
back. Of course, some suggest that this cure might be more danger-
ous than the disease.1"' Another proposal consists of halting all testing
and production of weapons and delivery systems and eliminating all
existing weapons under agreed, secure inspection with central en-
forcement to give security to the honest compliers.
To the extent that tests are in fact injurious to present and future
generations, it seems logical to stop them, if truly vital national
interests are not in each instance at stake. However, this cessation
requires even more than the thus-far unobtainable agreement of the
current nuclear powers on a safe, secure, inspected end to testing.
It requires not only that all other nations formally agree to refrain
from testing but also that the current nuclear powers be willing to
enforce the ban. In addition, it probably requires current powers to
share all their knowledge, and perhaps their weapons, with newly
emerging powers, and perhaps with everyone.
169 See, e.g., remarks of Frank Aiken of Ireland, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 14th Sess., ist
Comm., 1054th meeting, para. 7 (Nov. 13, 1959); Kahn, The Arms Race and its Hazards,
89 Dxdalus 744, 776-78 (1960).
1962 ]
408 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
If this means that a truly effective total ban cannot be devised,
short of the creation of a world community of substantially dis-
armed and federated or unified states, and if this is not possible in
the foreseeable future, then attention must be devoted to limiting
tests to areas where they will create little or no radiation damage.
This will also require a sharing in some form with the present "have-
nots"-at least with those capable and willing independently to
create nuclear weapons. This situation must be faced up to now, not
so much by lawyers, who can tell us essentially that there is little
law, that few precedents are relevant to the changed nature and
implications of the new technology, and, most important, that what
little law there is falls in the face of asserted needs of national security,
but by statesmen and national leaders. Otherwise, we may soon
reach that day when our scientists finally do agree that artificially
created radiation has reached levels clearly inimical to human health
and to humanity's future.
